

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 26-05-2009		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Civil-Military Relations Cube: A Synthesis Framework for Integrating Foundational Theory, Research, and Practice in Civil-Military Relations.				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael F. Minaudo Paper Advisor (if Any):				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <i>For Example:</i> Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of SE 704 Civil-Military Relations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			XX

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**The Civil-Military Relations Cube: A Synthesis Framework for
Integrating Foundational Theory, Research, and Practice in Civil-
Military Relations.**

by

Michael F. Minaudo, PhD

Major, United States Army

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial
satisfaction of the requirements of the SE 704 Civil-Military Relations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not
necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
Department of the Navy.**

Signature: _____

04 May 2009

Contents

Introduction	1
Background	2
Discussion/Analysis	4
Conclusions	9
Implications	13
Recommendations	16
Bibliography	17
Notes	18

Abstract

The field of Civil-Military Relations draws from many disciplines including: political science, psychology, history, economics, anthropology, sociology, systems, and others. This paper presents a "Civil-Military Relations Cube" in order to develop a greater understanding of the component parts of Civil-Military Relations and how they interact when theory and reality collide.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

The field of Civil-Military Relations draws from many disciplines including: political science, psychology, history, economics, anthropology, sociology, systems, and others. The topic of Civil-Military Relations may be considered to be a "niche" field of study in the broader view of academia. Can Civil-Military Relations be thoroughly understood through the lens of existing Civil-Military Relations Theory? This question generated the idea of developing a "Civil-Military Relations Cube" in an attempt to develop a greater understanding of the component parts of Civil-Military Relations and how they interact when theory and reality collide. The Civil-Military Relations Cube can be used as a starting point for exploration into the current state of Civil-Military theory.

BACKGROUND

It can be argued that there is not a need nor is it realistic to have a single, all encompassing, and unique Civil-Military Relations Theory. The idea of and lack of utility in developing an all-encompassing theory to understand a "niche" discipline is not unique to Civil-Military Relations. Civil-Military Relations is by its very nature a field that is firmly nested in the middle of various other disciplines. In many regards the idea for a Civil-Military Relations Cube is an application or adaptation of the work of Susan A. Lynham and Gary N. McLean in the field of Human Resource Development (HRD). Similarly to the field of Civil-Military Relations, Lynham and Mclean argue that what creates the uniqueness of HRD is that HRD theory, research, and practice are an "interface among the multidisciplinary sources and foci of theories interacting with domains of outcomes and modes of theory, theory development, and research."ⁱ

Purpose and Significance

The purpose of this paper is to explore the utility of a "Civil Military Relations Cube" as a useful tool for scholars and practitioners to use in developing a greater conceptual understanding of the complexities that are present in the field of Civil-Military Relations. This paper will review and evaluate existing theory in the field of Civil-Military

Relations. The intent is that the "Civil Military Relations Cube" will be used as a tool for furthering understanding and generating intercourse that may encourage the development of new theories that help to explain the complex field of Civil-Military Relations.

Assumptions and Limitations

The "Civil-Military Relations Cube" is a starting point for discussions and future theory development. The "Civil-Military Relations Cube" can be viewed as an evolving tool. It is fully expected that the construction and utility should be challenged in order to make the product as useful as possible to students, scholars, and practitioners.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
EXISTING CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY

Separation Theory

In 1957 Samuel P. Huntington published the "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations", which is viewed as the seminal work on civil-military relations. To frame the challenge of Civil-Military Relations Huntington clearly stated that

The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a social imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function.ⁱⁱ

Huntington argued for a strong professional military that would be able to defend the United States while still also being able to avoid the threats that civilian control had to bear. He called this "objective control".

The "Normal" Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Richard H. Kohn has characterized the state of civil-military relations in the U.S. since Vietnam as abiding by what he has phrased as the "normal theory" of civil military relations. More specifically the theory "calls for a clear line of demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the

actual war."ⁱⁱⁱ In many regards the theory can be viewed as a derivative of Huntington's work.

Agency Theory

Agency Theory was developed in the early 1970s and was mainly intended for addressing the relationship between management and subordinates. Eisenhardt's (1989) review of agency theory states that:

Agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principle to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the principle and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences.^{iv}

Peter D. Fever has applied the agency or principle-agent framework theory to Civil-Military relations and developed a deductive model of civil-military relations in the American context. Fever contends that in the American context


the essence of civil-military relations is deciding three issues under conditions of uncertainty: the civil decision to delegate some degree of policymaking power to the military, especially on matters relating to the use of force; the civilian decision on how to best monitor that delegation; and the military decision to

act strategically to enhance delegation and minimize monitoring.^v

It has been noted that four general patterns of civil military relations are present in Fever's theory. The four patterns are representative of the level of civilian oversight applied to the military in relation to the manner in which the military performs. The four relationships or patterns listed below could easily be plotted on the spectrum ranging from subjective control at one end to objective control at the other end.

1. Civilian Monitor Intrusively (CMI) - Military Works (MW) (Subjective Control)
2. Civilians Monitor Intrusively (CMI) - Military Shirks (MS)
3. Civilians Monitor Unobtrusively (CMU) - Military Works (MW) (Objective Control)
4. Civilians Monitor Unobtrusively (CMU) - Military Shirks (MS)^{vi}

Figure 1. Patterns of Civil-Military Relations



Concordance Theory

Dr. Rebecca L. Schiff developed Concordance Theory in the mid-1990s as part of her doctoral studies at the University of Chicago. The theory is focused on one aspect of the overall field of Civil-Military Relations. Schiff's theory accomplishes two main goals.

First, it explains which institutional and cultural conditions - separation, integration, or another alternative - prevent or promote domestic military intervention. Second, it predicts that when agreement on the four specific indicators prevail among three partners, domestic intervention is less likely to occur.^{vii}

Concordance Theory differs from the other prevailing theories in the field in the respect that it does not encourage but can condone the separation of civil and military institutions. Schiff's theory is based on the interaction of three key parties and four key indicators. The parties involved in the theory are the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry.

For a more complete understanding of concordance theory the three key parties involved will be further defined. The military is defined as "the armed forces and personnel who represent the military."^{viii} The political leadership is defined best in terms of function. Schiff states that

the exact nature of government institutions and the method of their selection are less important when determining concordance. What is more relevant is identifying the elites who represent the government and have direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces. Thus, cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchs are all possible forms of government elites.^{ix}

The citizenry is defined as "individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers, and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups that may be disenfranchised." ^x If the three parties agree on the four indicators it is less likely for there to be domestic military intervention.

In Schiff's theory there are only four primary indicators of concordance. The four indicators are: (1) the social composition of the officer corps; (2) the political decision making process; (3) the military recruitment method; and (4) the military style.^{xi} The social composition of the officer corps is a primary indicator because officers are usually career soldiers, they help to define the relationship between the military and society, and provide a linkage between the citizenry and the military as well as the military and the government.^{xii} The political decision making process is defined as and includes "the institutional organs of society that determines important factors for the military such as budget, materiel, military size, and structure."^{xiii} The


military recruitment method is defined as the way or system that a nation obtains enlistment of soldiers into the armed forces. Finally, military style is concerned with how people think about the military and what the ethos and appearance of the military is from both internal and external perspectives.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS CUBE

The Civil-Military Relations Cube (Figure 1) is a representation of many possible relationships and areas for explanation in the field of Civil-Military Relations. As a four dimensional cube the sides of the cube are representative of the following areas: 1) modes of theory, theory development, and research; 2) domains of outcomes; 3) theoretical foci; and (3) theoretical foundations.

The modes of theory, theory development, and research listed on the cube include normative (prescriptive) participatory, critical, social constructive, positivism, and post-positivism. Much of the theory development in the field of Civil-Military relations has been focused on the development of normative (prescriptive) theory. The prevailing theories such as separation theory, normal theory, agency theory, and concordance theory all are normative in nature.

Figure 2: The Civil-Military Relations Cube ^{xiv}



The area of the cube that is labeled domains of outcomes represents many areas that can be affected by civil military

relations. The domains range in size from the individual person all the way to the global level. The rest of the domains listed include group, process, organization, family, community, national, and regional.

Theoretical Foci are composed of people, processes, and outcomes. These three areas are the main components that theory is typically based. General theory development comes from one of the three broad based theoretical foci that are listed.

Civil-Military Relations is at the crossroads and convergence of many different disciplines. The relationships in some cases can be considered multi-disciplinary, intra-disciplinary, or interdisciplinary. Civil-Military theoretical foundations are based in the following fields: economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, systems, political science, and other related fields. A dimension of the cube represents these elements.

IMPLICATIONS

Traditional exploration of Civil-Military Relations is limited to only a small portion of the Civil-Military Relations Cube. The argument can be made that additional exploration of the other areas in the cube is necessary to develop theory to develop a greater understanding of the field. Why haven't these areas been explored? Are the relationships too obscure or esoteric for mass consumption?

An example of one specific area for possible exploration and theory development is the area and relationship between media and civil relations. Has the media and technology of the 21st century changed the world to such a degree that it has impacted the very nature of current and existing Civil-Military Relations Theory? For example, how has the changing media impacted current theory? Can new theory be developed based on the events that have been observed during the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan? Items such as the "strategic corporal", the 24-hour news cycle, and the internet have changed the environment in which the theory was conceived.

Could the items that were previously discussed such as the media be included as a component of Schiff's four key indicators in concordance theory? Does the media have the power to be disruptive to a theory such as concordance theory?

The media has played an every increasing role in blurring the lines between the three parties that Schiff discusses. Events such as the "Revolt of the Generals" may be enablers to low levels of non-concordance and be precursors to domestic military intervention.

Focusing specifically on the domains of outcome there are multiple areas that should be explored in order to develop additional Civil-Military Relations Theory. Most of the current theory focuses specifically on the national level. The global economy and interconnectedness of the world (governments, militaries, etc) has resulted in new realities of Civil-Military Relations. In the global and regional domains the following broad areas for future theory exploration are proposed:

1. What is the impact of the United Nations on member nation/non-member nations and their civil-military relations?
2. How has the 21st century impacted Civil-Military relations?
3. Do NGOs have the potential to impact civil military relations?
4. What is the Civil-Military theory or relationship that describes the phenomenon surrounding Terrorist Groups that may or may not have a sponsor state?

At the regional level the need for exploration into theory that helps explain the impact or partnerships such as NATO, EU, and GCC is necessary. Have these organizations served to add an additional layer to current existing theory or are there unique relationships that need to be explained? The level of global interaction in the 21st century has served to make the area of Civil-Military relations at the regional level more important.

Focusing solely on the U.S. and at the organizational level the impact of interagency operations on Civil-Military relations should be reexamined in light of the changing dynamics in conflicts such as the War on Terror. Terrorism has the potential to impact and shape Civil-Military relations for many years to come. Has the nature of the relationship been changed due to questionable actions that the Bush administration took in regards to terror suspects?

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recent theory such as Concordance Theory has served to expand the more limited scope of Civil-Military theory developed by traditional separation theorists such as Huntington. Additional research is necessary that explores the relationships of the components in the Civil-Military Relations Cube. By exploring the relationships it may be possible to develop new theories that help to explain the dynamics and interactions of the constituent parts that compose the Civil-Military Cube.

The Civil-Military Relations Cube is a working tool that is in a state of flux. As it is used to generate thought and theory it will change and adapt. Comments and discussion are solicited and desired. Please send your thoughtful input to: michael.minaudo@us.army.mil

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Eisenhardt, M., K. (1989). "Agency theory: An assessment and review". *Academy of Management Review*, 14(1), 57.
- Feaver, Peter D. *Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations*. The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 1986.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956.
- Lynham, S. A. and Gary N. McLean (2008). "The HRD Cube". Presented at the 2008 AHRD Conference in Lille, France. May 2008.
- Owens, Macubin, T. *Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain After 9/11*. Course material provided for SE 704 Civil-Military Relations at the Navy War College, Spring 2009.
- Owens, Macubin, T. "Civil Military Relations" (Lecture, U.S. Navy War College, Newport, RI, 24 Mar 2009.
- Schiff, Rebecca L. *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. New York, NY Routledge, 2008.

NOTES

ⁱ S. A. Lynham and Gary N. McLean, "The HRD Cube". Presented at the 2008 AHRD Conference in Lille, France. May 2008.

ⁱⁱ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 2.

ⁱⁱⁱ Macubin T. Owens, *Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain After 9/11*. Course material provided for SE 704 Civil-Military Relations at the Navy War College, Spring 2009. 7.

^{iv} M. K. Eisenhardt, M., K. "Agency theory: An assessment and review". *Academy of Management Review*, (1989) Volume 14(1), 57.

^v Peter D. Feaver, *Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations*. The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, 1986, 1.

^{vi} Macubin T. Owens, "Civil Military Relations." Lecture. U.S. Navy War College, Newport, RI, 24 Mar 2009

^{vii} Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations* (New York, NY Routledge, 2008), 43.

^{viii} *Ibid*, 44

^{ix} *Ibid*.

^x *Ibid*.

^{xi} *Ibid*.

^{xii} *Ibid.*, 45

^{xiii} *Ibid*.

^{xiv} The design of the Civil-Military Relations cube is based on the work of Susan A. Lynham and Gary N. McLean, 2008. The authors presented the HRD Cube at the 2008 AHRD Conference in Lille, France